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_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Germany’s Marriage of Necessity 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Overview  
 
 
Today Germany will have its first female Chancellor, its youngest (51) head of government and 
the first from the former communist eastern part of the country. This will be only the second time 
since 1949, and the first since Germany was reunited in 1990, that the country will experience a 
grand coalition of Christian and Social Democrats. It was a lengthy and difficult process, rather 
like “mating porcupines” according to outgoing Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.  
 
What will be their priorities and what are the chances of success? To most Germans the coalition 
will be judged on whether it can reduce the country’s huge five million unemployment figure. 
This will require renewed economic growth but there are sharp differences between the parties 
on how best to achieve this. There is little talk of renewal or flexibility. There is, however, 
greater agreement on the need to restore the public finances to good order and the parties have 
agreed a number of tax increases in an effort to reduce the ballooning budget deficit. Two other 
key areas are pension and healthcare reforms. For many years Germans have been used to lavish 
welfare benefits but the state can no longer afford such largesse. Getting the public to accept the 
need for cuts is another matter. On foreign policy there is a large measure of agreement with the 
emphasis on relations with France, Poland and the United States. But Washington should not 
expect an uncritical attitude by the new team in Berlin. The coalition agreement acknowledges 
the importance of good transatlantic relations but states clearly that differences should be 
discussed openly in a spirit of friendship and partnership. Europeans will be looking on 
anxiously to see whether the coalition can deliver because without reform in Germany the 
prospects elsewhere will remain bleak. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
When Angela Merkel is sworn in today as Germany’s Chancellor she will be making history. 
She will be not only the first female occupant of the Chancellor’s office but also the first leader 
from former communist East Germany to rise to the pinnacle of the political tree in Europe’s 
most important country. Six months before the elections in September Merkel looked as if she 
was heading for a sweeping triumph and could govern with her preferred junior partner, the 
liberal Free Democrats. But during the election campaign the Social Democrats (SPD) made a 
surprising comeback led by Gerhard Schroeder, their charismatic leader and Chancellor. The 
SPD’s recovery was aided by some major gaffes by Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) and its   2   
sister party, the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU). Particularly damaging was the 
impression that a CDU-led government would introduce a flat tax. This was a propaganda gift to 
the SPD who convinced many uncommitted voters that such a change would only benefit the 
rich. Merkel’s loss of a ten point poll lead and wafer-thin margin of victory has weakened her in 
the eyes of her party. But the pastor’s daughter from the east did not box her way to the top spot 
in the CDU without displaying some fighting qualities. She quickly called a vote to underline her 
authority and postponed any analysis of the CDU’s poor electoral performance until after the 
coalition negotiations were completed and she was safely installed in office. 
 
 
The Coalition  
 
 
It has taken over a month of hard bargaining to form the coalition and Merkel has paid a high 
price for her elevation to the Chancellor’s office. She had to agree to the SPD taking eight 
ministries including foreign affairs (Franz-Walter Steinmaier), finance (Walter Steinbruck) and 
labor (Vice-Chancellor and former SPD boss Franz Munterfering). The SPD have elected a new 
party leader, Mathias Platzeck, a rising star from the east, who will play a key role behind the 
scenes in holding the coalition together. The CDU and CSU have six ministries, including 
defense and economic affairs. The balance is made up by Merkel herself and a Cabinet office 
minister. Merkel has no government experience but she has ministers in her team such as 
Wolfgang Schauble (interior) who have previously served in government. Initially the CSU 
leader, Edmund Stoiber, wanted the economics ministry but he rejected the post when it became 
clear that he would have relatively little power compared to the finance minister. Many think he 
would have found it difficult if not painful to serve in a Cabinet under a woman who he clearly 
considers inferior to himself. Stoiber, who was narrowly beaten by Schroeder three years ago, 
will likely carp from the sidelines but his influence in Bavaria and nation wide has been 
weakened by his volte-face. A number of other CDU regional leaders have refused to join the 
coalition giving rise to speculation that they doubt whether it will last the planned four years. But 
neither of the coalition parties has an interest in early elections. They are condemned to try and 
make a success out of their coalition agreement. 
 
 
Foreign Policy 
 
 
The coalition agreement states that European integration and the Atlantic partnership are of 
“central importance” for Germany. Merkel’s first foreign trip, the day after her inauguration, will 
be to Paris followed by Warsaw. This is a clear sign of continuity with priority given to 
Germany’s immediate large neighbours. Merkel has met President Chirac before but her closest 
political ally is Nicolas Sarkozy, the talented and pushy interior minister who has ambitions to 
become president in 2007.  In Warsaw Merkel will find the political situation confusing as the 
nationalist Law and Justice party struggles to form a minority government. But the visits to 
France and Poland are symbolic of Merkel’s wish to revitalize the Weimar triangle, a loose 
Franco-German-Polish alliance. 
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Merkel is also on good terms with another Christian Democrat in a key position, Jose Manuel 
Barroso, President of the European Commission. Europe did not feature too highly in the 
coalition agreement but Germany takes over the EU presidency in the first half of 2007 and will 
wish to do a good job. (see below). 
 
It was no secret that Tony Blair had hoped for a clear victory for Angela Merkel, believing that 
she shared his commitment to liberal economic policies. But Merkel is no Thatcher and her 
desire to introduce reforms, never strong in the first place, will now be tempered by coalition 
politics. 
 
Relations with Russia will change. Merkel is unlikely to develop the bonhomie that existed 
between Schroeder and Vladimir Putin. She will pay more attention to the smaller states in 
Europe, something Schroeder neglected during his years in office. 
 
George W Bush will be delighted to see the end of Schroeder. But he should not expect that 
Merkel will follow the US blindly. The coalition agreement recognizes the importance of NATO 
and transatlantic relations but also points to the necessity of airing disputes openly and in a spirit 
of friendship and partnership.  
 
 
European Policy 
 
 
The coalition agreement recognizes that Germany has a special responsibility for the 
maintenance and continuation of European integration. The present crisis, following the no votes 
in the French and Dutch referenda on the constitutional treaty, should be regarded as an 
opportunity to re-engage with citizens and concentrate only on the essentials. Germany wants to 
keep the treaty alive and hopes that the ratification process can be continued in 2006. The 
coalition will also take a more hard-headed approach to defending Germany’s interests in 
Brussels including another push to get the German language used more. Berlin will pay its fair 
share into the budget and no more. There will be no drastic reform of the common agricultural 
policy. Restoring economic growth and increasing productivity are priorities but the agreement is 
silent on details. The agreement warns some of the new member states not to engage in tax 
dumping. There should be increased powers for Europol (Europe’s fledgling FBI) and Eurojust 
(dealing with criminal matters). Germany hopes to meet the growth and stability pact criteria by 
2007. On enlargement the coalition supports the start of accession negotiations with Turkey but 
warns that if Ankara does not meet the requirements for membership then it will have to settle 
for a privileged partnership with the EU. On defense the agreement accepts the need for a 
stronger European defense force that is fully compatible with NATO. 
 
 
Domestic policy 
 
 
There is no doubt that the economy will be the central issue that makes or breaks the coalition. 
The two parties have agreed a package that includes:   4   
substantial public spending cuts to try and reduce Germany’s ballooning deficit (estimated to 
reach €41 billion next year) within 3% - the limit under EU rules – by 2007 
a 3% increase in VAT sales tax – from 16% to 19% - to increase revenue 
raising the retirement age from 65 to 67 
redefining powers between the federal state and the regions 
 
Business leaders have not been impressed with this package. They had wanted Merkel to push 
through more radical reforms that would have seen a cut in income taxes and more flexible labor 
markets. The CDU had promised to end centralized wage bargaining but the SPD, under strong 
union pressure, refused to move. Business also wanted an extension of nuclear power but these 
plans were also vetoed by the Social Democrats. Many economists also doubt the wisdom of 
hiking VAT when there is so little consumer confidence. Another sensitive policy area requiring 
urgent reform, the health sector, was quietly shelved due to lack of agreement. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Even before Angela Merkel takes office there has been a wave of criticism, largely from business 
circles, abut the watering down of the reform program. Given the restraints of building a grand 
coalition this was inevitable. But as the new SPD leader Platzeck said, it was a marriage of 
necessity not a marriage of love. The fact is that Germany’s problems are so huge that no single 
party can tackle them alone. The forced marriage of CDU and SPD may not be romantic but it 
offers Germany the best way out of a dire economic situation. Given the importance of Germany 
to the European and global economy we should all be raising a glass to the newly married 
couple. 
 
 
 